Methods for selections with logic in elections, games, shows and lottery

ABSTRACT

The invention herein is novel and practical in providing a method for introducing mathematical logic in games, show-games and lottery, upon which election may be made between two choices that survive elimination. The mathematical logic is simply the product of a division of group of choices into small and large groups of choices, with the reasonable expectation that the sought-after choice is in the large group. After random elimination of all the choices, except each mandatory selected choice plus another choice, of which one must be the sought-after choice, logical election is guarantied, after seeing whether one of the surviving choices came from the small group or the large group of choices. The present invention is also novel and practical in providing a method for letting each voter to divide a group of candidates in two groups and, then, vote for all the candidates in one of the groups, or to have a group of contestants divided into pairs and the voters to vote for elimination one contestant in each pair, in turn. Such a method in elections makes it highly probable that the winner has, at least, been chosen by the majority of the voters, if not by all the voters.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The invention herein relates to methods for fair elections, games, show-games and lottery. In one method, secret selection from a set of choices divides the set of choices into small set and large set, which precedes a mandatory single selection. Such division of choices makes it more probable that the sought-after choice may be found among the large set of choices, whereupon, election between the two choices that had survived elimination could be based on mathematical logic. In another method, there is a division of the set of choices into two sets of choices, of which one set may be chosen for division of its choices into a small group of choices and a large group of choices, in order to provide sensible basis for related decisions.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

The present invention is novel in that it provides methods for fair chance of winning. Further, the present invention is also practical because its methods could be used to supplement, complement and improve many existing games, show-games, lottery and elections, where selections are paramount, by converting senseless selections into sensible selections.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to games, shows, lottery and elections where a player, contestant, candidate, or a voter, may be required to make selections from a group of individually labeled choices. The choices may represent, among other things, safes, cases, values, numbered tickets, or persons. The invention introduces novel methods, not utilized to this day. In one method, a ticket holder, a player, a contestant, or a candidate has fair odds in selecting and electing a sought-after choice from given choices. Another method lets a voter in en election to divide a group of candidates in two groups and vote for each of the candidates in one of the groups, so as to make certain that the winning candidate received the majority of the votes.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIGS. 1, 2, 3, and 4 are schematic diagrams of one embodiment of the present invention, where a player plays against a banker and there are the minimum possible safes in play.

FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of another embodiment of this invention, where unlimited number of players may join a banker in a game that have unlimited safes and is intended primarily to be played via Internet web site.

FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of a show-game and it is one more embodiment of the present invention, which involves a host, a contestant and a set of cases, which is intended primarily as a show-game for Television networks, similar to the show-game “Deal or No Deal”.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

A simple version of the present invention, shown in FIGS. 1, 2, 3 and 4, is a game involving a banker, a player and a set of three safes, of which one of the safes is the banker's safe, where the sough-after monetary value is hidden. FIG. 1 shows safes A, B and C. $2 is deposited in the banker's safe C, $1 from the banker and $1 from the player. First, the player has divided the safes into two groups, safe A, as the small group and safes BC, as the large group. This division makes it more probable that the banker's safe is safe B or safe C. The player, then, selects safe B and the banker eliminates the empty safe among the safes not selected, which is safe A. The player knows that since the odds between safe B and safe C are equal, withdrawal is the right move for getting the $1 refunded. FIG. 2 shows the same safes A, B and C as in FIG. 1. Here, the player elects safe A because it is more probable that case A is the banker's safe. In fact, the money was not there and the banker wins the $10. FIG. 3 shows the same safes A, B and C as in FIG. 1. Here, safe A is the banker's safe and the secretly selected safe B was randomly eliminated, because the banker has to eliminate one of two empty safes, since the player selected the banker's safe A. Logic made the player elect safe A because it was more likely that when safe C was picked secretly, the banker's safe should have been safe A or safe B. For the fact that safe B has been eliminated, it was prudent to elect safe A and the player did in fact win the $20. FIG. 4 shows the same safes A, B and C as in FIG. 1. Here, the situation is similar to the situation in FIG. 3. Since safe C has been eliminated, Logic has dictated that safe A should be elected. However, the player elected, unreasonably, to withdraw and, therefore, there is no refund and the banker wins the $4.

In another version of this invention is a game that may involve more than three safes and more than one player. Each player could, therefore, make more than one undisclosed selections before making the single mandatory selection, shown in FIGS. 5.

In a game intended primarily for Internet users, FIG. 5 shows that the banker has chosen to have only four more participants in the game and to present for play one hundred safes. In addition, the banker decided that each player input is $1 and that the play period must be for 1/hr. FIG. 5 also shows that $5, which included the Baker's $1 input, was randomly deposited in undisclosed safe 4 and that safe 17, together with the mandatory selected safes 00, 11, 12 and 44, have survived the random elimination.

In still another version, among others, of the invention is a show-game that involves a host, a contestant, a set of numbered cases and varying values in each case, as shown in FIG. 6.

FIG. 6 shows that the contestant in a show-game, such as “Deal or No Deal”, has divided the set of cases into small group of case #3 and large group of the rest of the cases, before making the mandatory single case selection for rejection from the set of cases, where a sought-after value is hidden, so as to have a fair chance to get the lesser value case rejected.

Each game-play version seen in FIGS. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 may be played in any setting including Television shows, Internet web sites and other means of communications. In Internet web site, for example, an individual can log in as a banker, deposit the required fees and set the rules and conditions for the game-play. Other individuals may join as players, by logging-in and paying the required fees. The value received from each participant, in equal shares, is randomly deposited in the undisclosed banker's safe.

The beauty of the present invention is that in the version shown in FIG. 5, an individual may be the banker in multiple games and join as a player in other games after logging in, once.

Another beauty of the invention is the fact that it could supplement, compliment and improve any game-play, show-game, lottery, or election system, which is lacking the mathematical logic upon which a player, a contestant, a ticket holder, or a candidate, may base the critical move when deciding between given choices.

In FIG. 5, player A has lost because safe 17, which has not been eliminated, was in player A secretly selected safes and the elected safe 44 was empty. Player B elected, correctly, to withdraw and because the banker has won, player B did not win or lose. Player C should have elected safe 11 and not withdraw, even though safe 11 was not the banker's safe. Therefore, player C has lost. Player D has failed to complete all the moves in a timely manner, therefore, player D has lost. At the end, the banker has won $4 out of $5.

FIG. 6 shows eight cases, each with undisclosed and different monetary value as follows: case #1 with $100; case #2 with $1000; case #3 with $10,000; case #4 with $100,000; case #5 with $1,000,000; case #6 with $1, case #7 with $10 and case #8 with $50. The contestant picked case #2, with the hope it contains the $1,000,000. Before selecting case #5 for rejection, the contestant has divided the cases in a small group of one case #3 and a large group that includes all the rest of the cases, so as to establish mathematical probability of likelihood that the sought-after case is in the large group. The random elimination that occurs leaves two cases standing, case #5, the selected case for rejection, and case #1 from the large group, provided, the sought-after case must be Case #5 or case #1. Based on pure logic, the contestant elects to switch case #5 with case #1, because it was more probable that case #1 has lower monetary value than case #5. Thus, the $100 is lost and the $1,000,000 is still in play. The host offers a “Deal” and the contestant answer is “No Deal”. The contestant next selection of case #5 for rejection was preceded by selecting cases #3 and #6 to be in the small group. After the random elimination, case #5 and case #6 were left standing. The contestant elects not to switch case #5 with case #6, because case #6 came from the small group. This time, however, logic did not work, as it should, and the $1,000,000 is lost. The host offers a “Deal” and the contestant takes the “Deal”.

Accordingly, it is an object of the present invention to provide games in which a participant has unlimited options and to make sure that each election shall have logical basis. Another object of the invention is to open vast opportunities for variety of games, shows and other social activities where the choices are unlimited. Furthermore, my invention includes, also, a method for letting each voter in election systems to divide the candidates in two groups and vote for every candidate in the chosen group. In selection by vote shows a candidate may also divide the voters in a process similar to the process used in FIG. 6, in order to have a fair chance to win more votes.

In an election, a registered voter should have the right to cast his single ballot or vote for any number of candidates running for Office. Furthermore, candidates should have the right to receive all the votes they are entitled to receive. The Constitution of the United States guarantees free and fair elections, which could be achieved only when each registered voter is allowed to vote for one or more candidates running for the same single Office. In a general election, for example, a register voter should be free to vote for any number of the Presidential candidates, whether there are two, three, or more running for the Office of President. That is to say, one ballot for each candidate he or she chooses to vote for. The same should apply to all elective offices, referendum, or selection by vote.

The unfair results of past elections make it clear that the Framers of the United States Constitution envisioned true equality in the exercise of the right to vote. This is what the 14^(th), 15^(th) and the 19^(th) Amendments to the Constitution have guaranteed, namely, free and fair elections.

It is obvious that elected and appointed officials, have prevented citizens of the United States, by means of statutory enactments, regulations and rules promulgations, from exercising their Constitutional rights to vote in free and fair elections, which prevented candidates, who could have received the majority of the votes, from being elected. Many candidates, who did not have the support of the majority of the people, were elected.

The two-party system, for example, may still be preserved. However, even in such a system, the right to vote shall not be “abridged” by the states. The states must let each voter vote for any number of the democratic presidential hopefuls, or for any number of the republican presidential hopefuls, as the case maybe. A substantial number of voters are prevented from voting for the candidates of their preferred choices. This is because their preferred choices may have already been eliminated by means of unfair election practices. The rights of all voters to vote in free and fair elections have been abridged. Many potential voters may have even decided not to vote at all after concluding that their votes will have no real meaning or impact on the election. The current election practices are inherently unfair because votes have unequal effect on elections. It is also true that virtually all candidates were deprived of votes they could have received had the present invention has been implemented. The fundamental concept here is that injustices to voters and candidates can be addressed by simply letting voters vote for all the candidates of their choice, no matter what election structure is in place. It can easily be demonstrated that the present invention is feasible and practical because the only change it causes is in the number of ballots to be counted. Then, it will be up to each state whether to maintain the entire election structure as it has been, or to do away with unnecessary processes like the runoff elections. Four Amendments, which refer directly to voting rights, say that the right to vote “. . . shall not be denied or abridged . . . ” The meaning of these words “denied or abridged” is that the right to vote must not only be denied completely but also it must not be curtailed, in any way.

Under the current election system, it is inevitable that the elected President is not necessarily the majority choice of the Electoral College or the majority of the people, when there is a third party candidate. On the other hand, the method in the present invention, which is constitutionally imperative, will guarantee that the President will always have the majority of the votes, or the majority of the Electoral College.

The states may have not denied the people the right to vote, in a technical sense. However, the states have abridged that right. It is inherent in the method presented by my invention, as well as in the Constitution that an elected candidate should always be chosen by the majority of the voters, or the majority of the Electoral College. The states should not interpret the terms “denied” as a license to give the people “some” rights to vote. The inherent interest of democracy is that the majority must rule. Many controversial issues, which have evolved under the current unfair election practices may never be solved, no matter how much legislative effort are expanded, unless my method for election is implemented.

For an election to be free and fair there must be a choice between two candidates, two sides, two groups, or two parties. This was the idea behind the two-party system. In reality it is impossible to limit the number of candidates to two for any specific office. Yet, in past elections the notion of free and fair election has been ignored and the practice of choosing one candidate from three or more candidates was forced on the people.

In a presidential election, for instance, when there is a choice between two candidates running for President, it is similar to a choice between two sides, or two groups of candidates. In a case where there are three presidential candidates, a voter should have the right to divide the candidates in two groups—one group of one candidate and the other group of two candidates. This way, a vote for the group of one would have the same quality and equality as a vote for the group of two. The significance of such practice is that by voting for one side of this equation a voter is authorizing—under Constitutional mandated understanding—the votes that would be cast for the other candidate, or candidates, on the other side of the equation. Therefore, each voter may be regarded as having voted for the President-elect, whether or not he or she actually voted for him.

In past elections, when there were three or more presidential candidates, the votes cast for candidates other than for the President-elect have not authorized the votes cast for the President-elect. Therefore, such votes may not be regarded as votes for the President. That is why citizens could have refused to accept the President-elect as their President.

It is possible, under this two-group method, that with a third party presidential candidate, each of the three candidates for President would receive about one-third of the votes. Yet, even in such a case, the candidate receiving the most votes should be considered as having been elected by all the voters, even though only about one-third actually voted for him. Each voter would know that even if he or she did not actually vote for all of his or her preferred candidates, because of the way he or she has divided the candidates in two groups and the choice that has been made, he or she has authorized the election of the President-elect, even if in fact he or she did not vote for him. Therefore, it is highly probable that in a general election, where there is a third party candidate for President, the voters would more likely focus their attention on whether not to vote for their last choice than on whether to vote for their first choice. In other words, most voters will probably choose to vote for their two preferred choices rather than for their first choice and the President-elect would, in fact, be of the majority and also would be regarded as President of the people and by the people. This would render any thoughts of safeguard, such as “super-delegates”, against any undesirable winner, unnecessary. This is because there would be no reasonable risk, under the method in the present invention, of electing a candidate who is an extremist and undesirable by the great majority of the people.

Although the foregoing invention has been described in some detail by way of illustration and example for purposes of clarity and understanding, it will be readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the teaching of this invention, that certain changes and modifications may be made thereto without departing from the spirit or scope of the appended claims. 

1. A method for improving games, show-games, contest-shows and lottery, by introducing mathematical logic in the election between two choices, that have survived elimination of all the other choices in the group of choices, so as to give the respective player, contestant, or ticket-holder, a fair chance to win the sought-after choice, which must always be one of said two surviving choices, comprising the steps of: (a) Labeling, or numbering, each choice, in the group of choices, for individual identification; (b) Letting each player, contestant, or ticket-holder, to divide the group of choices in small and large groups; (c) Requiring each player, contestant, or ticket-holder, to select a single choice after said division; (d) Eliminating all choices, but the sought-after choice and each of the mandatory single choice selected; (e) Observing, to see whether the surviving choice, which is not a mandatory single choice selected, is from the small group; (f) Electing the respective mandatory single choice selected after the division if the other surviving choice is from the small group.
 2. The method for improving of claim 1, wherein the mathematical logic is based on the principle of probability that the sought-after choice is more likely to be in the large group.
 3. The method for improving of claim 1, wherein the group of choices may consist of persons, safes, cases, tickets, or anything that can hide, or represent values.
 4. The method for improving of claim 1, wherein the division in small and large groups may be done in secret.
 5. The method for improving of claim 1, wherein the mandatory single choice, selected after the division, should be from the large group.
 6. The method for improving of claim 1, wherein the elimination must be done in random if a mandatory single choice selected after the division is the sought-after choice.
 7. The method for improving of claim 1, wherein the respective mandatory single choice selected after the division and elimination should be elected if the other choice is from the small group, because an option to withdraw from the game is unreasonable and would result in forfeiting a refund.
 8. The method for improving of claim 1, wherein the respective show-game may include a host, a contestant and a set of numbered cases, where each case is representing different value from the values in the other cases and the contestant is required to select, for rejection, one case from the set of cases after the division in small group and large group is made by the contestant and, then, the contestant elects the one case from the two cases that survive random elimination, whereby, said case is rejected from the show-game and an offer is made to the contestant by the host to take the current accumulated reward and withdraw from the show-game, or to stay and play and have a fare chance for increasing the reward, but with the risk of diminishing it.
 9. A game played via Internet web site, where an individual, by logging-in as a banker, may set the rules and conditions for other individuals, who may join by logging-in, as players, comprising: (a) A banker; (b) Players; (c) Labeled-safes, of which one is the undisclosed banker's safe; (d) Monetary values from the banker and each of the players, in equal shares, deposited in the banker's safe; (e) Means for providing each player the option of dividing the safes, in secret, in two groups, one small and one large; (f) Means for randomly eliminating all the safes, following the mandatory selection of a single safe by each player, except the mandatory selected single safe by each of the players and one extra safe, of which one must be the banker's safe; (g) Means for giving each player the option of electing the respective mandatory selected single safe and its content, or withdrawing from the game; (h) Means for determining that the respective option to withdraw has been reasonably made and, therefore, a refund of the monetary share to the respective player is warranted.
 10. A method for letting each voter in an election to vote for any number of candidates, comprising the steps of: (a) Listing the names of the candidates; (b) Enabling each voter to divide the candidates in two groups; (c) Permitting each voter to vote for each of the candidates in one of the respective two groups; (d) Counting the votes, which each of the candidates has received; (e) Rejecting all the candidates except the two candidates receiving the highest number of votes; (f) Conducting a runoff election between said two candidates; (g) Declaring the candidate that received the most votes in the runoff the true winner by all the voters.
 11. The method for letting of claim 10, wherein the candidates may be beauty contestants, or talent competitors, as for example, the “American Idle” show, where the current process of voting is unfair and may result in electing the worse, or even the worst candidate, unless the present invention is adapted.
 12. The method for letting of claim 11, wherein only two contestants, or competitors, are presented for election, in turn, for the voters to vote and to eliminate one of them, until the last contestant, or competitor, remains standing as a winner by the true majority of the voters.
 13. The method for letting of claim 10, wherein the candidates are more than two, as for example, candidate A, candidate B and candidate C, of whom each voter has the option to divide into two groups of group A and group BC, group B and group AC, or group C and group AB, for the purpose of letting each voter to vote for each candidate in the group the voter has chosen.
 14. The method for letting of claim 13, wherein each of the candidates A, B and C has to have as many votes as possible in order to win a political office, a title, or a prize, by winning as many voters as possible to be included in their respective groups of voters.
 15. The method for letting of claim 14, wherein each candidate has the option of secretly dividing each of said respective group of voters, where each such group consists of a set of groups of voters, where each group includes different number of voters, into small set and large set before selecting the mandatory single group from the large set for rejection, and when random elimination occurred, after the mandatory selection, only two groups may survive elimination, the mandatory selected group and another group from the sets, but one of them must be the group with the smallest number of voters, so as to give the respective candidate a fair chance to elect for rejection the group with the smallest number of voters, based on the principle of probability, whereupon, a sensible decision could be made, whether to have the voters already on hand and stick with them, or to go ahead for more voters, but with the risk of losing voters already on hand.
 16. The method for letting of claim 15, wherein the votes in each group of voters in the set of groups are computed for each respective candidate and the candidate receiving the most votes is declared the winner.
 17. The method for letting of claim 15, wherein the votes on hand, as to each candidate, are determined on the basis of how many groups, in the set of groups, with fewer voters have been rejected as compared with how many groups, in the set of group, with greater number of voters have been rejected.
 18. The method for letting of claim 11, wherein the contest, or competition may be produced as a game, a show-game, or political race via Internet web sites, Television event and other means of communication.
 19. The game of claim 9, wherein it must be obvious to each player if all the remaining safes in the large group of safes, after removing all the secret selections and all the mandatory selections, are eliminated.
 20. The method for improving of claim 1, wherein it must be obvious to each player, or contestant, if all the remaining choices in the large group of choices, after removing all the secret selections and all the mandatory selections, are eliminated. 